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Abstract—This paper presents secrecy analyses of a full-duplex
MIMOME network which consists of two full-duplex multi-
antenna users (Alice and Bob) and an arbitrarily located multi-
antenna eavesdropper (Eve). The paper assumes that Eve’s
channel state information (CSI) is completely unknown to Alice
and Bob except for a small radius of secured zone. The first part
of this paper aims to optimize the powers of jamming noises
from both users. To handle Eve’s CSI being unknown to users,
the focus is placed on Eve at the most harmful location, and the
large matrix theory is applied to yield a hardened secrecy rate
to work on. The performance gain of the power optimization
in terms of maximum tolerable number of antennas on Eve is
shown to be significant. The second part of this paper shows
two analyses of anti-eavesdropping channel estimation (ANECE)
that can better handle Eve with any number of antennas. One
analysis assumes that Eve has a prior statistical knowledge of its
CSI, which yields lower and upper bounds on secure degrees of
freedom of the system as functions of the number (N) of antennas
on Eve and the size (K) of information packet. The second
analysis assumes that Eve does not have any prior knowledge
of its CSI but performs blind detection of information, which
yields an approximate secrecy rate for the case of K being larger
than N.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, secrecy rate, full-duplex
radio, MIMOME, jamming, artificial noise, anti-eavesdropping
channel estimation (ANECE).
I. INTRODUCTION
Security of wireless networks is of paramount importance
in today’s world as billions of people around the globe are
dependent upon these networks for a myriad of activities
for their businesses and lives. Among several key issues in
wireless security [1], confidentiality is of particular interest to
many researchers in recent years and is a focus of this paper.
For convenience, we will refer to confidentiality as security
and vice versa.
The traditional way to keep information confidential from
unauthorized persons and/or devices is via cryptography at
upper layers of the network, which include the asymmetric-key
method (involving a pair of public key and private key) and the
symmetric-key method (involving a secret key shared between
two legitimate users). As the computing capabilities of modern
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computers (including quantum computers) rapidly improve,
the asymmetric-key method is increasingly vulnerable as this
method relies on computational complexity for security. In
fact, the symmetric-key method is gaining more attraction in
applications [2].
However, the establishment of a secret key (or any secret)
shared between two users is not trivial in itself. Even if a
secret key was pre-installed in a pair of legitimate devices
(during manufacturing or otherwise), the lifetime of the secret
key in general shortens each time the secret key is used for
encryption. For many applications such as big data streaming,
such secret key must be periodically renewed or changed. To
enjoy the convenience of mobility, it is highly desirable for
users to be able to establish a secret key in a wireless fashion.
Establishing a secret key or directly transmitting secret
information between users in a wireless fashion (without a pre-
existing shared secret) is the essence of physical layer security
[3]. There are two complementary approaches in physical layer
security: secret-key generation and secret information trans-
mission. The former requires users to use their (correlated)
observations and an unlimited public channel to establish a
secret key, and the latter requires one user to transmit secret
information directly to the other. This paper is concerned with
the latter, i.e., transmission of secret information (such as
secret key) between users without any prior digital secret.
Specifically, this paper is focused on a network as illustrated
in Fig. 1 where one legitimate user (Alice) wants to send
a secret key to another legitimate user (Bob) subject to
eavesdropping by an eavesdropper (Eve) anywhere. Each of
the two users/devices is allowed to have multiple antennas,
and both Alice and Bob are capable of full-duplex operations.
Following a similar naming in the literature such as [4], we
call the above setup a full-duplex MIMOME network where
MIMOME refers to the multi-input multi-output (MIMO)
channel between Alice and Bob and the multi-antenna Eve.
The MIMOME related works in the literature include: [4]–
[15] where the channel state information (CSI) at Eve is
assumed to be known not only to Eve itself1 but also to Alice
and Bob; [16]–[19] where a partial knowledge of Eve’s CSI is
assumed to be available to Alice and Bob and an averaged
secrecy or secrecy outage was considered; [13], [20]–[25]
where artificial noise is embedded in the signal from Alice; and
[26]–[31] where Bob is treated as a full-duplex node capable
to receive the signal from Alice while transmitting jamming
noise.
1All entities are treated as “gender neutral”.
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2From the literature, the idea of using jamming noise from
Alice or Bob appears important. Inspired by that, this paper
will first consider a case where both Alice and Bob send
jamming noises while Alice transmits secret information to
Bob. We will explore how to optimize the jamming powers
from Alice and Bob. In [27], jamming from both users was
also considered. But here for power optimization we include
the effect of the residual self-interference of full-duplex radio.
There are other differences in the problem formulation and
objectives. We assume that Eve’s CSI is completely unknown
to Alice or Bob except for a radius of secured zone free of
Eve around Alice. A similar idea was also applied in [32] but
in a different problem setting. We will focus on Eve that is
located at the most harmful position. Furthermore, to handle
the small-scale fading at Eve, we apply the large matrix theory
to obtain a closed-form expression of a secrecy rate, which
makes the power optimization tractable. Unlike [25] where
large matrix theory was also applied, we consider an arbitrary
large-scale-fading at Eve among other major differences. With
the optimized powers, we reveal a significant performance gain
in terms of the maximum tolerable number of antennas on
Eve to maintain a positive secrecy. We will also show that as
the number of antennas on Eve increases, the impact of the
jamming noise from either Alice or Bob on secrecy vanishes.
This contribution extends a previous understanding of single-
antenna users shown in [31].
Later in this paper, we will analyze a two-phase scheme for
secret information transmission proposed in [31]. In the first
phase, an anti-eavesdropping channel estimation (ANECE)
method is applied which allows users to find their CSI but
suppresses Eve’s ability to obtain its CSI. In the second
phase, secret information is transmitted between Alice and
Bob while Eve has little or no knowledge of its CSI. We show
two analyses based on two different assumptions. The first
analysis assumes that Eve has a prior statistical knowledge of
its CSI. With every node knowing a statistical model of CSI
anywhere, we use mutual information to analyze the secret
rate of the network, from which lower and upper bounds
on the secure degrees of freedom are derived. These bounds
are simple functions of the number of antennas on Eve. The
second analysis assumes that Eve does not have any prior
knowledge of its CSI. Due to ANECE in phase 1, Eve is
blind to its CSI. But in phase 2, Eve performs blind detection
of the information from Alice. We analyze the performance
of the blind detection, from which an approximate secret rate
is derived and numerically illustrated. Both of these analyses
are important contributions useful for a better understanding
of ANECE.
Notation: Matrices and column vectors are denoted by
upper and lowercase boldface letters. The trace, Hermitian
transpose, column-wise vectorization, (i, j)th element, and
complex conjugate of a matrix A are denoted by Tr (A),
AH , vec (A), Ai,j , and A∗, respectively. For a matrix X and
its vectorized version x, ivec (x) is the inverse operation of
x = vec (X). A diagonal matrix with elements of x on its
diagonal is diag
(
xT
)
. Expectation with respect to a random
variable x is denoted by Ex [·]. Let the random variables Xn
and X be defined on the same probability space, and we write
Fig. 1. A Full-Duplex MIMOME network
Xn
a.s.→ X if Xn converges to X almost surely as n → ∞.
The identity matrix of the size n×n is In (or I with n implied
in the context), and 1n is a row vector of length n of all ones.
A circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable x
with variance σ2 is denoted as x ∼ CN (0, σ2). The mutual
information between random variables x and y is I (x; y), and
h(x) denotes the differential entropy of x. Logarithm in base
2 is denoted by log (·), and (·)+ , max (0, ·).
II. OPTIMIZATION OF JAMMING POWERS AND EFFECTS OF
EVE’S ANTENNAS
A. System Model
Our network setup is shown in Fig. 1, where Alice (with
NA antennas) intends to send secret information over a
wireless channel to Bob (with NB antennas) in the presence
of possibly many passive Eves (of NE antennas each) that
may collude with each other at the network layer but not at
the physical layer. We will focus on the most harmful Eve.
Physical layer colluding among distributed Eves to form a
large virtual antenna array is highly difficult in practice. But
if a virtual antenna array from colluding Eves is likely in some
applications, we could treat these colluding Eves as a single
mega Eve with a large number of antennas.
The system parameters are normalized in a similar way
as in [29]. In particular, the large-scale-fading factor from
Alice to Eve is modeled as (when a model is needed):
a = d−αA =
(
(x+ 0.5)
2
+ y2
)−α/2
, and that from Bob to
Eve is b = d−αB =
(
(x− 0.5)2 + y2
)−α/2
where α is the
path-loss exponent. We assume that no Eve is closer to Alice
than a radius ∆, i.e., dA ≥ ∆. The normalized large-scale-
fading factor of the residual self-interference at both Alice
and Bob is denoted by ρ. (In all simulations, ρ is considered
to be 0.1%.) The small-scale-fading channel matrix from Alice
to Eve is denoted by A, that from Bob to Eve is B, and that
of the residual self-interference at Bob and Alice are G and
K, respectively2. The channel matrix from Alice to Bob is
denoted by H, and its SVD is denoted by
H = UΣVH , (1)
where U and V are unitary matrices, and Σ is the NB ×NA
diagonal matrix that contains the singular values of H (i.e.,
2Up to Section III, Alice is only a transmitter, and hence it does not utilize
its full-duplex capability.
3σi, i = 1, · · · , NB) in descending order assuming NA ≥ NB .
All the elements in all channel matrices are modeled as i.i.d.
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with
zero mean and unit variance.
In this section, we assume that Alice and Bob have the
knowledge of H but not of A and B, and Eve has the
knowledge of all these matrices.
Alice sends the following signal containing r ≤ NB ≤ NA
streams of secret information mixed with artificial noise:
xA(k) = V1s(k) + V2wA(k), (2)
where k is the index of time slot, V1 is the first r columns of
V, V2 is the last NA−r columns of V, s(k) is Alice’s infor-
mation vector with the covariance matrix Qr and Tr (Qr) =
Ps, and wA(k) is an (NA − r)×1 artificial noise vector with
distribution CN
(
0, PnNA−r I
)
. Here, Ps + Pn = PA ≤ PmaxA .
While Bob receives information from Alice, it also sends a
jamming noise:
xB(k) = wB(k), (3)
where wB(k) is an NB × 1 artificial noise vector with
distribution CN
(
0, PBNB I
)
.
Note that both PA and PB are normalized powers with
respect to the path loss from Alice to Bob, and with respect
to the power of the background noise. So, without loss of
generality, we let the power of the background noise be one.
With jamming from both Alice and Bob, the signals received
by Bob and Eve are respectively:
yB(k) = HV1s(k) + HV2wA(k) +
√
ρGw¯B(k) + nB(k),
(4)
yE(k) =
√
aA1s(k) +
√
aA2wA(k) +
√
bBwB(k) + nE(k),
(5)
where [A1,A2] = [AV1,AV2] = AV. Since A1 and A2
are linear functions of the Gaussian matrix A, they remain
Gaussian. Because of the unitary nature of V, A1 and A2
are independent of each other, and all elements in them are
i.i.d. Gaussian of zero mean and unit variance. The noise
vectors nB and nE are distributed as CN (0, I). Also note that√
ρGw¯B(k) is the residual self-interference originally caused
by wB(k) but is independent of wB(k) [31].
If CSI anywhere is known everywhere, the achievable
secrecy rate of the above system is known [33] to be
RS = (RAB −RAE)+ (6)
where RAB is the rate from Alice to Bob and RAE is the rate
from Alice to Eve. Namely,
RAB = log |I + C−1B HV1QrVH1 HH |, (7)
RAE = log |I + aC−1E A1QrAH1 |, (8)
where
CB = I +
Pn
NA − rHV2V
H
2 H
H +
ρPB
NB
GGH , (9)
CE = I +
aPn
NA − rA2A
H
2 +
bPB
NB
BBH . (10)
Note that since HV1 = U1Σ1 and HV2 = U2Σ2 are
orthogonal to each other where U1 and U2 are the partitions of
U similar to those of V, and Σ1 and Σ2 are the corresponding
diagonal partitions of Σ, a sufficient statistics of s(k) at Bob
is UH1 yB(k) = Σ1s(k) +
√
ρU1Gw¯B(k) + U1nB(k) which
shows that the artificial noise from Alice does not affect Bob.
Consequently, an equivalent form of RAB is
RAB = log |Ir + C−1B,1Σ1QrΣ1|, (11)
where
CB,1 = Ir +
ρPB
NB
UH1 GG
HU1. (12)
However, the expression shown in (7) is needed later due to
its direct connection to H and G.
If we optimize Pn, PB and Qr to maximize the above RS ,
the solution would be a function of Eve’s CSI. This does not
appear to be useful in practice.
If Eve’s CSI is unknown to Alice but the statistics of Eve’s
CSI is known to Alice, then we can consider the ergodic
secrecy:
R¯S = (EH,G[RAB ]− EA,B[RAE ])+ (13)
which is achievable via coding over many CSI coherence
periods. Closed form expression of each of the two terms in
the above can be obtained using ideas in [34] and [35]. But
if we use R¯S as objective to optimize Pn, PB and Qr, the
solution would be independent of the CSI between Alice and
Bob, and such a solution is not very useful either.
Because of the above reasons, we will consider the worst
case of RAE . The worst case is such that Eve is located at the
most harmful location and has a large number of antennas.
It is shown in our earlier work [36] that the most harmful
position of Eve is at x∗ = −0.5 − ∆ and y∗ = 0. From
now on, we will refer to a and b as corresponding to the
position (x∗, y∗). In all simulations, we will use ∆ = 0.1
unless mentioned otherwise.
Given a large number of antennas at Eve, we can use large
matrix theory to obtain a closed-form expression of RAE that
is no longer dependent on instantaneous CSI at Eve, which is
shown next. We can rewrite (8) as follows:
RAE = log |I + J3Θ¯3JH3 | − log |I + J4Θ¯4JH4 | (14)
where J3 = 1√NE [A1,A2,B], J4 =
1√
NE
[A2,B], and
Θ¯3 = NEdiag
[
aqTr ,
aPn
NA − r1NA−r,
bPB
NB
1NB
]
, (15)
Θ¯4 = NEdiag
[
aPn
NA − r1NA−r,
bPB
NB
1NB
]
(16)
where qr is the vector containing the diagonal elements of the
diagonal matrix Qr (assuming that Alice does not know Bob’s
self-interference channel). Note that the J matrices consist of
i.i.d. random variables and the Θ¯ matrices are diagonal. (The
numbering of 3 and 4 used here is because of the numbering
later.)
Lemma 1. Let J be an N × K matrix whose entries are
i.i.d. complex random variables with variance 1N , and Θ be
4Fig. 2. Comparison of the exact random realizations of RAE
NE
with its
asymptotic result (the red/solid curve).
a diagonal deterministic matrix. Based on Theorem (2.39) of
[37], as N,K →∞ with KN → β, we have
1
N
log |I + JΘJH | a.s.→ Ω (β,Θ, η) , (17)
where
Ω (β,Θ, η) , βVΘ (η)− log (η) + (η − 1) log (e) , (18)
VΘ (η) , 1
LΘ
LΘ∑
j=1
log (1 + ηΘj,j) . (19)
Here, Θj,j is the jth diagonal element of the diagonal matrix
Θ, LΘ is the number of diagonal elements of Θ, and η > 0
is the solution to the equation
1− η = βη
LΘ
LΘ∑
j=1
Θj,j
1 + ηΘj,j
. (20)
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A. 
Using the lemma, it follows from (14) that for large NE ,
RAE
'
LΘ¯3∑
j=1
log
(
1 + η¯3
(
Θ¯3
)
j,j
)
−
LΘ¯4∑
j=1
log
(
1 + η¯4
(
Θ¯4
)
j,j
)
+NE log
(
η¯4
η¯3
)
+NE (η¯3 − η¯4) log (e)
, RAE (21)
where for i = 3, 4, η¯i is the solution of η to (20) with β = β¯i
and Θ¯ = Θ¯i. Here, β¯3 = NA+NBNE and β¯4 =
NA−r+NB
NE
. Note
that the right side of (20) is a monotonic function of η ≥ 0
and hence a unique solution of 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 can be easily found
by bisection search.
It is useful to note that the asymptotic form RAE is a good
approximation of the exact form RAE as long as NE is large
regardless of NA and NB . Shown in Fig. 2 is a comparison
of the exact random realizations of RAENE from (8) with its
asymptotic result RAENE from (21) where NA = 2NB = 8, r =
NB , Qr = PsNB I, Ps = Pn =
PA
2 . Note that 100 realizations of
RAE
NE
corresponding to 100 random realizations of Eve’s CSI
for each value of PA are shown. We see that as NE increases
(beyond 8), RAENE becomes a good approximation of
RAE
NE
.
B. Power Optimization and Maximum Tolerable Number of
Antennas on Eve
With (RAB − RAE)+ as the objective function, we can
now develop an optimization algorithm to optimize the power
distribution. Note that since the CSI required for RAB is
known to Alice and Bob, we do not need to replace RAB
by its asymptotic form.
Specifically, we can use this cost function g(xr) , RAE −
RAB where xr = [qTr , Pn, PB ]
T . Then, we need to solve the
following problem:
min
r
min
xr
g (xr)
s.t.
r∑
i=1
qr(i) + Pn ≤ PmaxA
qr(i) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , r
Pn ≥ 0
0 ≤ PB ≤ PmaxB .
(22)
Here the optimization of r is simple, which can be done via
sequential search. For a given r, the above problem is not
convex. Although the constraints are convex, the cost g (xr)
is not. To see this, let us rewrite this function as follows:
g (xr) = − log |CB + HV1QrVH1 HH |+ log |CB |
+
LΘ¯3∑
j=1
log
(
1 + η¯3
(
Θ¯3
)
j,j
)
−
LΘ¯4∑
j=1
log
(
1 + η¯4
(
Θ¯4
)
j,j
)
+NE log
(
η¯4
η¯3
)
+NE (η¯3 − η¯4) log (e) . (23)
The non-convex parts of g (xr) are log |CB | and∑LΘ¯3
j=1 log
(
1 + η¯3
(
Θ¯3
)
j,j
)
, which are concave functions of
xr. These two terms can be replaced by their upper bounds
based on the first-order Taylor-series expansion around the
solution of the previous iteration. Also, the dependence of
g (xr) on η¯3 and η¯4 can be resolved by choosing the values
of η¯3 and η¯4 as follows:
1− η¯ti =
β¯iη¯
t
i
LΘ¯i
LΘ¯i∑
j=1
(Θ¯ti)j,j
1 + η¯ti(Θ¯
t
i)j,j
, i = 3, 4. (24)
where t denotes the tth iteration. In other words, at iteration
t, the following convex problem is solved:
xt+1r = arg min
xr
ht (xr)
s.t.
r∑
i=1
qr(i) + Pn ≤ PmaxA
qr(i) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , r
Pn ≥ 0
0 ≤ PB ≤ PmaxB .
(25)
where
ht (xr) = − log |CB + HV1QrVH1 HH |
−
LΘ¯4∑
j=1
log
(
1 + η¯t4
(
Θ¯4
)
j,j
)
+
(
xr − xtr
)T ∇xrf t|xr=xtr ,
(26)
5Algorithm 1 Algorithm for power optimization
Choose proper , η¯03 , η¯
0
4 , and set g
min = 0.
for r = 1 : NA do
Initialize xr satisfying the constraints.
Set t = 0.
while ‖x
t
r−xt−1r ‖
‖xt−1r ‖ >  do
Solve (25) to get xt+1r .
Update η¯3, η¯4 by solving (24) using xt+1r .
t = t+ 1.
end while
if g (xtr) < gmin then
gmin = g (xtr)
xmin = xtr
end if
end for
Return xmin.
and f t (xr) = log |CB | +
∑LΘ¯3
j=1 log
(
1 + η¯t3
(
Θ¯3
)
j,j
)
. All
constant terms in (23) are omitted in (26) as they do not affect
the optimization.
Algorithm 1 details the proposed procedure for the power
optimization. It is worth mentioning that a different optimiza-
tion approach was explored in our previous work [36], where a
stochastic optimization approach was applied to the objective
function RAB − E [RAE ]. These two approaches more or less
give the same results, but Algorithm 1 in this paper has a
significantly lower complexity. To illustrate a performance
gain of the optimized powers over non-optimal powers, we
will not repeat similar figures as available in [36]. But next
we consider the maximum tolerable number of antennas on
Eve, which can be defined in several ways. One is
N˜E , maxNE , s.t. RAB −RAE > 0. (27)
which however depends on instantaneous CSI everywhere.
Another is
N¯E , maxNE , s.t. RAB −RAE > 0. (28)
where RAB and RAE are asymptotic forms of RAB and RAE
respectively. Obviously, N¯E is a function of xr. The third
definition is
N¯optE , maxNE , s.t.
(
1
L
L∑
l=1
(RoptAB,l −RoptAE,l)
)+
> 0.
(29)
where RoptAB,l−RoptAE,l is a value of RAB−RAE corresponding
to a random realization of H and G and the corresponding
optimal xr and r, and L is the total number of realizations of
H and G for each NE .
To obtain N¯E in (28), we will let NA > NB , r = NB and
Qr =
Ps
NB
I. Hence, range(V2) is the null-space of H. As a
consequence, HV1QrVH1 H
H = PSNB HH
H , and (7) becomes
RAB =
log |I + ρPB
NB
GGH +
Ps
NB
HHH | − log |I + ρPB
NB
GGH |
= log |I + J1Θ1JH1 | − log |I + J2Θ2JH2 |
(30)
where J1 = 1√NB [H,G], J2 =
1√
NB
G, Θ2 = ρPBI, and
Θ1 = diag ([Ps1NA , ρPB1NB ]). Applying the lemma to (30)
yields that for β1 = NA+NBNB , β2 = 1 and a large NB ,
RAB
NB
' Ω (β1,Θ1, η1)− Ω (β2,Θ2, η2)
= (β1 − 1) log(1 + η1Ps) + log 1 + η1ρPB
1 + η2ρPB
+ log(
η2
η1
) + (η1 − η2) log(e)
, RAB
NB
(31)
where η1 is the solution of η to (20) with β = β1 and Θ = Θ1,
which reduces to
1− η1 = (β1 − 1)η1Ps
1 + η1Ps
+
η1ρPB
1 + η1ρPB
. (32)
and η2 is the solution to
1− η2 = η2ρPB
1 + η2ρPB
, (33)
or equivalently η2 =
√
1+4ρPB−1
2ρPB
.
Also with r = NB and Qr = PsNB I, RAE in (21) reduces
to
RAE
NE
' Ω (β3,Θ3, η3)− Ω (β4,Θ4, η4)
= (β3 − β4) log
(
1 +
aPsη3
β3 − β4
)
+(β3 − β4) log β3 − β4 + bPBη3
β3 − β4 + bPBη4
+(2β4 − β3) log 2β4 − β3 + aPnη3
2β4 − β3 + aPnη4
+ log
(
η4
η3
)
+ (η3 − η4) log (e)
, RAE
NE
(34)
where
Θ3 = NEdiag
([
aPs
NB
1NB ,
aPn
NA −NB 1NA−NB ,
bPB
NB
1NB
])
,
(35)
and
Θ4 = NEdiag
([
aPn
NA −NB 1NA−NB ,
bPB
NB
1NB
])
, (36)
also β3 = NA+NBNE , β4 =
NA
NE
, η3 is the solution to
1− η3 = aPsη3
1 + aPsη3
1
β3−β4
+
aPnη3
1 + aPnη3
1
2β4−β3
+
bPBη3
1 + bPBη3
1
β3−β4
, (37)
and η4 is the solution to
1− η4 = aPnη4
1 + aPnη4
1
2β4−β3
+
bPBη4
1 + bPBη4
1
β3−β4
. (38)
6Fig. 3. Comparison of N¯E and N¯
opt
E vs NA.
Fig. 4. 95% confidence interval of the number of iterations needed for
convergence of Algorithm 1 vs. NA. The dark line is the mean of the number
of iterations.
Fig. 3 shows N¯E versus NA and N¯
opt
E versus NA where
PmaxA = P
max
B = 30dB and NA = 2NB (β1 = 3). For N¯E ,
we also chose Ps = Pn = PA2 and PA = PB . We see that
N¯optE is consistently larger than N¯E . And the gap between the
two is due to the power optimization.
During simulation, we also observed that the optimal Ps
is often distributed approximately equally between different
streams, and that if NE gets larger, the optimization favors
smaller PB and smaller r (the latter of which is consistent
with a result in [38] which does not use full-duplex jamming
at Bob).
With the same parameters as in Fig. 3, Fig. 4 illustrates a
convergence property of Algorithm 1 where the mean number
of iterations needed for convergence versus NA is shown. Also
shown in Fig. 4 is the 95% confidence interval of the number
of iterations needed for convergence versus NA. We used 100
random realizations of the channels for each value of NA. The
threshold  used for convergence was chosen to be 0.01.
C. When the Number of Antennas on Eve is Very Large
We now consider the case where NE  NA > NB , r =
NB and Qr = PsNB I. It follows that β3  1 and β4  1.
Hence, (37) implies 1−η3 ≈ β3 and (38) implies 1−η4 ≈ β4.
Furthermore, referring to the terms in (34), we have
lim
NE→∞
NE(β3 − β4) log
(
1 +
aPsη3
β3 − β4
)
= NB log
(
1 +
NEaPs
NB
)
, (39)
Fig. 5. The convergence of RAE to R∗AE
lim
NE→∞
NE(β3 − β4) log β3 − β4 + bPBη3
β3 − β4 + bPBη4
= NB log 1 = 0, (40)
lim
NE→∞
NE(2β4 − β3) log 2β4 − β3 + aPnη3
2β4 − β3 + aPnη4
= (NA −NB) log 1 = 0, (41)
lim
NE→∞
NE
(
log
(
η4
η3
)
+ (η3 − η4) log (e)
)
= lim
NE→∞
NE
(
log
1− β4
1− β3 + (β4 − β3) log e
)
= lim
NE→∞
NE log
(
1 +
NB
NE − (NA +NB)
)
−NB log e
= lim
NE→∞
NE
NB
NE − (NA +NB) log e−NB log e
= 0. (42)
The above equations imply that all terms, except the first, in
RAE from (34) converge to zero. Therefore,
lim
NE→∞
RAE = lim
NE→∞
RAE = NB log
(
1 +
NEaPs
NB
)
, R∗AE
(43)
which is independent of Pn and PB (and hence the optimal
Pn and PB are now zero). This result implies that if Eve has
an unlimited number of antennas then the jamming noise from
either Alice or Bob has virtually no impact on Eve’s capacity
to receive the information from Alice. Furthermore, we see that
RAE increases without upper bound as NE increases while
RAB stays independent of NE (for large NE).
Fig. 5 compares R∗AE from (43) with RAE from (34) where
NA = 2NB = 8 and PA = PB = 2Ps = 2Pn. We see that
the two results are very close when NE > 40.
III. ANALYSIS OF ANECE
A key observation from the previous section is that if Eve
knows its CSI and the number of antennas on Eve is large,
then neither the artificial noise from multi-antenna Alice nor
the full-duplex jamming from multi-antenna Bob can rescue
Alice and Bob from being totally exposed to Eve. (This
observation is an extension of a previous observation for
single-antenna users shown in [31].) To handle Eve with large
number of antennas, there is a two-phase method involving
7anti-eavesdropping channel estimation (ANECE) proposed in
[31]: in phase 1 the users conduct ANECE which allows users
to obtain their CSI but denies Eve the same ability; and in
phase 2 the users transmit information to each other with
Eve not knowing its CSI. Both phases are within a common
coherence period. While the earlier work has shown promising
properties of ANECE, the understanding of ANECE is still
incomplete. In this section, we show two new analyses of
the secrecy rate of a two-user MIMOME network assisted by
ANECE.
To simplify the problem, we do not consider the artificial
noise from either Alice or Bob. The first analysis assumes a
(globally known) statistical model for all CSI in the network.
And the analysis is based on ideal full-duplex devices where
there is no self-interference. When a result of this analysis
is applied to practice, one must restrict the application to
situations where the residual self-interference is negligible.
Typically, the residual self-interference is proportional to the
transmitted power which increases with the distance between
devices. So, a situation where the residual self-interference is
negligible corresponds generally to a short-range communica-
tion. The second analysis assumes that Eve does not know the
statistical distribution of its CSI but rather assumes that Eve is
able to perform blind detection of the information from Alice.
These two analyses constitute an important new understanding
of ANECE, which is not available elsewhere.
A theory where Eve knows the statistical distribution of its
CSI can be applicable to situations where Eve’s CSI is sta-
tistically stationary and experiences many cycles of coherence
periods in a time window of interest. A theory where Eve does
not know its CSI distribution can be applicable to situations
where Eve’s CSI is statistically un-stationary in a time window
of interest. Both assumptions have their own merits.
A. Eve uses a statistical model of its CSI
Consider a block Rayleigh fading channel for which Alice
and Bob first conduct ANECE by transmitting their pilot
signals pA(k) and pB(k) concurrently (in full-duplex mode)
where k = 1, · · · ,K1 (K1 is the length of the pilot), and
then transmit information to each other (over K2 samples).
For information transmission, we will consider a one-way
transmission and a two-way transmission separately.
1) Channel estimation: Define Pi = [pi(1), · · · ,pi(K1)]
where i = A,B. then the corresponding signals received by
Alice, Bob and Eve can be expressed as
YA = H
TPB + NA (44a)
YB = HPA + NB (44b)
YE =
√
aAPA +
√
bBPB + NE (44c)
where H is the reciprocal channel matrix between Alice and
Bob, and all the noise matrices consist of i.i.d. CN (0, 1).
Here, the self-interferences at Alice and Bob are assumed to
be negligible.
It is known and easy to show that for the best performance
of the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation (or the MMSE
estimation as shown later) of H by Bob, PA should be such
that PAPHA =
K1PA
NA
INA . Similarly, PB should be such that
PBP
H
B =
K1PB
NB
INB .
In the following analysis, we assume that H, A and B all
consist of i.i.d. CN (0, 1) elements (from one coherence block
to another). This statistical model along with the large-scale
fading factors a and b is assumed to be known to everyone.
Without loss of generality, let NA ≥ NB . Without affecting
the channel estimation performance at Alice and Bob, but max-
imizing the difficulty of channel estimation for Eve, we let the
row span of PB be part of the row span of PA. More specifi-
cally, we can write PA =
√
K1PA
NA
[INA ,0NA×(K1−NA)]Γ and
PB =
√
K1PB
NB
[INB ,0NB×(K1−NB)]Γ where Γ can be any
K1 × K1 unitary matrix. In this way, any estimates of A
and B by Eve, denoted by Aˆ and Bˆ, are ambiguous in that
[
√
aAˆ,
√
bBˆ] can be added to Θ[CA,CB ] without affecting
Eve’s observation YE where Θ ∈ CNE×NB is arbitrary and
[CA,CB ][P
T
A,P
T
B ]
T = 0.
Let h = vec(H), a = vec(A), b = vec(B), yA =
vec(YTA), yB = vec(YB), nA = vec(N
T
A) and nB =
vec(NB). Note vec(XYZ) = (ZT ⊗ X)vec(Y). Then (44)
becomes
yA = (INA ⊗PTB)h + nA (45a)
yB = (P
T
A ⊗ INB )h + nB (45b)
yE =
√
a(PTA ⊗ INE )a +
√
b(PTB ⊗ INE )b + nE . (45c)
It is known that the minimum-mean-squared-error (MMSE)
estimate of a vector x from another vector y is xˆ =
Kx,yK
−1
y y with Kx,y = E{xyH} and Ky = E{yyH}.
And the error ∆x = x − xˆ has the covariance matrix
K∆x = Kx −Kx,yK−1y KHx,y.
Let hˆA be the MMSE estimate of h by Alice, and ∆hA =
h − hˆA be its error. Similar notations are defined for Bob
and Eve. It is easy to show that the covariance matrices
of the errors of these estimates are, respectively, K∆hA =
σ2AINANB , K∆hB = σ
2
BINANB , K∆a = σ
2
EAINANE and
K∆b = σ
2
EBINBNE where σ
2
A =
1
1+K1PB/NB
, σ2B =
1
1+K1PA/NA
, σ2EA =
bK1PB/NB+1
(aK1PA/NA+bK1PB/NB)+1
and σ2EB =
aK1PA/NA+1
(aK1PA/NA+bK1PB/NB)+1
.
2) One-way information transmission: Now assume that
following the pilots (over K1 samples) transmitted by Alice
and Bob in full-duplex mode, Alice transmits information
(over K2 samples) to Bob in half-duplex mode. Namely, while
the first phase is in full-duplex, the second phase is in half-
duplex. In the second phase, Bob and Eve receive
YB = HSA + NB
YE =
√
aASA + NE
(46)
where SA = [sA(1), . . . , sA(K2)]. The corresponding vector
forms of the above are
yB = (IK2 ⊗H)s¯A + nB (47a)
yE =
√
a(IK2 ⊗A)s¯A + nE (47b)
where s¯A = vec(SA) (which is assumed to be independent
of all channel parameters). Then an achievable secrecy rate
8in bits/s/Hz in phase 2 from Alice to Bob (conditional on the
MMSE channel estimation in phase 1) is
Rone = 1
K2
(
I(s¯A; yB |hˆB)− I(s¯A; yE |aˆ)
)+
(48)
To analyze Rone, we now assume PA = PB = P (which
holds for both phases 1 and 2) and that sA(k) are i.i.d. with
CN (0, PANA INA). We also use HˆB = ivec(hˆB) ∈ CNB×NA
(i.e., hˆB = vec(HˆB)).
We will next derive lower and upper bounds on Rone.
To do that, we need to obtain lower and upper bounds on
I(s¯A; yB |hˆB) and those on I(s¯A; yE |aˆ).
First, we have
I(s¯A; yB |hˆB) = h(s¯A|hˆB)− h(s¯A|yB , hˆB)
= h(s¯A)− h(s¯A|yB , hˆB). (49)
It is known that h(s¯A) = log
[
(pie)NAK2
∣∣∣ PANA INAK2∣∣∣]. It
is also known [39] that for a random vector s ∈ Cn×1
and another random vector w, h(s|w) ≤ log [(pie)n|Ks|w|]
where Ks|w = Ks − Ks,w(Kw)−1Ks,w which is the co-
variance matrix of the MMSE estimation of s from w.
Note that yB = (IK2 ⊗ HˆB )¯sA + (IK2 ⊗ ∆HB )¯sA + nB .
Then conditional on HˆB (which is independent of s¯A), the
covariance matrix of the MMSE estimate of s¯A from yB
is Ks¯A|yB ,hˆB =
PA
NA
INAK2 − P
2
A
N2A
(IK2 ⊗ HˆHB )( PANA (IK2 ⊗
HˆBHˆ
H
B ) + KB + INBK2)
−1(IK2 ⊗ HˆB) where KB =
E{(IK2 ⊗ ∆HB)s¯As¯HA (I ⊗ ∆HHB )} = PA1+K1PA/NA INBK2 .
Using |IrA + AB| = |IrB + BA| where rA and rB are the
numbers of rows of A and B respectively, one can verify
that log |Ks¯A|yB ,hˆB | = NAK2 log PANA + log |KB + INBK2 | −
log | PANA (IK2 ⊗ HˆBHˆHB ) + KB + INBK2 | = NAK2 log PANA −
K2 log |INB + PA/NA1+ PA
1+K1PA/NA
HˆBHˆ
H
B |. Applying the above
results to (49) yields
I(s¯A; yB |hˆB)
≥ log | PA
NA
INAK2 | − E{log |Ks¯A|yB ,hˆB |}
= K2E{log |INB +
PA/NA
1 + PA1+K1PA/NA
HˆBHˆ
H
B |}
, R−B .
(50)
To derive an upper bound on I(s¯A; yB |hˆB), we now write
I(s¯A; yB |hˆB) = h(yB |hˆB)− h(yB |hˆB , s¯A). (51)
Here, h(yB |hˆB) ≤ E{log[(pie)NBK2 | PANA (IK2 ⊗ HˆBHˆHB ) +
KB + INBK2 |]} = K2E{log[(pie)NB | PANA (HˆBHˆHB ) +
(1 + PA1+K1PA/NA )INB |]}, and h(yB |hˆB , s¯A) =
E{log[(pie)NBK2 | 11+K1PA/NA (STAS∗A ⊗ INB ) + INBK2 |]} =
NBE{log[(pie)K2 | 11+K1PA/NA (STAS∗A) + IK2 |]}. Note that
conditional on hˆB and s¯A the covariance matrix of yB is
invariant to hˆB . Now define
MA =

NA
PA
STAS
∗
A, K2 < NA
NA
PA
S∗AS
T
A, K2 ≥ NA
(52)
which is a full rank matrix for any NA and K2 and a self-
product of
√
NA
PA
SA with i.i.d. CN (0, 1) entries. Also define
tA = min{NA,K2} and rA = max{NA,K2}. It follows that
(as part of h(yB |hˆB , s¯A))
E{log | 1
1 +K1PA/NA
(STAS
∗
A) + IK2 |}
= E{log | PA/NA
1 +K1PA/NA
MA + ItA |}
≥ tAE{log(1 + | PA/NA
1 +K1PA/NA
MA|
1
tA )} (53a)
= tAE
{
log(1 +
PA/NA
1 +K1PA/NA
exp(
1
tA
ln |MA|)
)}
≥ tA log
(
1 +
PA/NA
1 +K1PA/NA
exp(
1
tA
E{ln |MA|})
)
(53b)
= tA log
(
1 +
PA/NA
1 +K1PA/NA
exp(
1
tA
tA∑
j=1
rA−j∑
k=1
1
k
− γ))
(53c)
where (53a) is due to the matrix Minkowskis inequality |X +
Y|1/n ≥ |X|1/n + |Y|1/n where X and Y are n×n positive
definite matrices [40], (53b) is due to the Jensen’s inequality
and that log(1 + aex) is a convex function of x when a > 0,
and (53c) is based on [41, Th.1] where γ u 0.57721566 is
Euler’s constant. Defining eA = exp( 1tA
∑tA
j=1
∑rA−j
k=1
1
k − γ)
and applying the above results since (51), we have from (51)
that
I(s¯A; yB |hˆB)
≤ K2E{log |INB +
PA/NAHˆBHˆ
H
B
1 + PA1+K1PA/NA
|}
+NB log
(
(1 + PA1+K1PA/NA )
K2(
1 + PA/NA1+K1PA/NA eA
)tA)
, R+B
(54)
From (50) and (54) we see that the difference between the
upper and lower bounds on I(s¯A; yB |hˆB) is the second term
in (54).
To consider I(s¯A; yE |aˆ) in (48), we let Aˆ = ivec(aˆ).
Similar to the discussions leading to (50) and (54), one can
verify that
I(s¯A; yE |aˆ) ≥ K2E{log |INE+
PA/NAAˆAˆ
H
1 + PAσ2EA
|} , R−E (55)
and
I(s¯A; yE |aˆ)
≤ R−E +NE log
(
(1 + PAσ
2
EA)
K2(
1 + (PAσ2EA/NA)eA
)tA)
, R+E
(56)
When PA = PB = P → ∞, we have σ2EA → bNAaNB+bNA ,
σ2B → 0, E{aˆiaˆ∗i } → aNBaNB+bNA and E{hˆB,ihˆ∗B,i} → 1.
From [42, Th.2], we know that E{log |Ir + Pt XXH |} →
9min(r, t) logP + o(logP ) as P → ∞ where the entries of
X ∈ Cr×t are i.i.d. CN (0, 1). Therefore, from (50) and (54),
lim
P→∞
R−B
logP
= lim
P→∞
R+B
logP
= K2 min{NA, NB} (57)
And from (55) and (56), we have
lim
P→∞
R−E
logP
= 0 (58)
and
lim
P→∞
R+E
logP
=
{
0, K2 ≤ NA
NE(K2 −NA), K2 > NA
(59)
Combining (57), (58) and (59) and using R+one , 1K2 [R
+
B −
R−E ]+ and R−one , 1K2 [R
−
B − R+E ]+ (i.e., R−one ≤ Rone ≤
R+one), we have
lim
P→∞
R−one
logP
=

min{NA, NB}, K2 ≤ NA(
min{NA, NB} − NE
K2
(K2 −NA)
)+
, K2 > NA
(60)
and
lim
P→∞
R+one
logP
= min{NA, NB}. (61)
Note that limP→∞ RonelogP is called the secure degrees of free-
dom of the one-way information transmission. From (60) and
(61), we see that when K2 ≤ NA, we have limP→∞ RonelogP =
min{NA, NB} which equals the degrees of freedom of the
main channel capacity from Alice to Bob. This supports and
complements a conclusion from [31] where the analysis did
not use the complete statistical model of H, A and B. We
also see from (60) that if K2 > NA, the above lower bound on
secure degrees of freedom decreases linearly as NE increases.
3) Two-way information transmission: Now we consider
a two-way (full-duplex) communication in the second phase
where the signals received by Alice, Bob and Eve in a
coherence period are
YA = H
TSB + NA
YB = HSA + NB
YE =
√
aASA +
√
bBSB + NE
(62)
where SA = [sA(1), . . . , sA(K2)] and sA(t) ∼ CN (0, PANA I).
Similarly SB = [sB(1), . . . , sB(K2)] and sB(t) ∼
CN (0, PBNB I). Note that all information symbols from Alice
and Bob are i.i.d.. The vectorized forms of (62) are
yA = (IK2 ⊗HT )s¯B + nA
yB = (IK2 ⊗H)s¯A + nB
yE =
√
a(IK2 ⊗A)s¯A +
√
b(IK2 ⊗B)s¯B + nE
(63)
where both s¯A and s¯B are assumed to be independent of
all channel parameters. Conditional on the MMSE channel
estimation in phase 1, an achievable secrecy rate in phase 2
by the two-way wiretap channel is (e.g., see [43]):
Rtwo = 1
K2
(
I(s¯B ; yA|hˆA) + I(s¯A; yB |hˆB)
− I(s¯A, s¯B ; yE |aˆ, bˆ)
)+ (64)
The following analysis is similar to the previous section, for
which we will only provide the key steps and results.
From (50) and (54), we already know a pair of lower and up-
per bounds on I(s¯A; yB |hˆB). To show a similar pair of lower
and upper bounds on I(s¯B ; yA|hˆA), we let HˆA = ivec(hˆA).
One can verify that
I(s¯B ; yA|hˆA)
≥ K2E{log |INA +
PB/NB
1 + σ
2PB
1+σ2T1PB/NB
HˆTAHˆ
∗
A|} , R−A
(65)
and
I(s¯B ; yA|hˆA) ≤ R−A +NA log
(
(1 + PB1+K1PB/NB )
K2(
1 + PB/NB1+K1PB/NB eB
)tB )
, R+A
(66)
where eB = exp( 1tB
∑tB
j=1
∑rB−j
k=1
1
k − γ), tB =
min{NB ,K2} and rB = max{NB ,K2}.
For I(s¯A, s¯B ; yE |aˆ, bˆ), we use Bˆ = ivec(bˆ) (similar to Aˆ).
One can verify that KyE |aˆ,bˆ =
PA
NA
(IK2⊗AˆAˆH)+ PBNB (IK2⊗
BˆBˆH) + KEA + KEB + INEK2 where KEA = E{(IK2 ⊗
∆A)s¯As¯
H
A (IK2 ⊗ ∆A)H} = σ2EAPAINEK2 and KEB =
E{(IK2 ⊗∆B)s¯B s¯HB (IK2 ⊗∆B)H} = σ2EBPBINEK2 . Also
note that yE = (STA ⊗ INE )hEA + (STB ⊗ INE )hEB + nE .
Then,
I(s¯A, s¯B ; yE |aˆ, bˆ)
= h(yE |aˆ, bˆ)− h(yE |aˆ, bˆ, s¯A, s¯B)
≤ E{log[(pie)K2NE |KyE |aˆ,bˆ|]} − h(yE |aˆ, bˆ, s¯A, s¯B)
= E{log |KyE |aˆ,bˆ|} − E{log |σ2EA(STAS∗A ⊗ INE )
+ σ2EB(S
T
BS
∗
B ⊗ INE ) + INEK2 |}
= K2E{log | PA
NA
AˆAˆH +
PB
NB
BˆBˆH + (1 + PAσ
2
EA
+ PBσ
2
EB)INE |}
−NEE{log |σ2EASTAS∗A + σ2EBSTBS∗B + IK2 |}
(67)
Define SAB = [SˇTA, Sˇ
T
B ] ∈ CK2×(NA+NB) where
SA =
PA
NA
SˇA and SB = PBNB SˇB . Define T =
diag{σ2EA PANA INA , σ2EB PBNB INB}. Then we can rewrite the last
term from (67) as E{log |σ2EASTAS∗A + σ2EBSTBS∗B + IK2 |} =
E{log |IK2 + SABTSHAB |}.
For K2 < NA +NB , we have
E{log |IK2 + SABTSHAB |}
≥ K2E{log(1 + |SABTSHAB |
1
K2 )}
= K2E
{
log
(
1 + exp
( 1
K2
ln |SABTSHAB |
))}
≥ K2E
{
log
(
1 + exp
( 1
K2
lnσ2K2min|SABSHAB |
))}
≥ K2 log
(
1 + σ2mineE1
)
(68)
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where eE1 = exp( 1K2
∑K2
j=1
∑NA+NB−j
k=1
1
k − γ). The sec-
ond inequality in (68) is from the fact (e.g., see [44, Th.
3]) that |SABTSHAB | ≥ σ2K2min|SABSHAB | where σ2min =
min{σ2EA PANA , σ2EB PBNB }. Similarly, for K2 ≥ NA + NB , we
have
E{log |I + SABTSHAB |}
= E{log |I + TSHABSAB |}
≥ (NA +NB)E
{
log
(
1
+ |T| 1NA+NB exp( 1
NA +NB
ln |SHABSAB |
))}
≥ (NA +NB) log
(
1 + |T| 1NA+NB eE2
)
(69)
where eE2 = exp( 1NA+NB
∑NA+NB
j=1
∑K2−j
k=1
1
k − γ) There-
fore, using (68) and (69), we have from (67) that
I(s¯A, s¯B ; yE |aˆ, bˆ)
≤ K2E{log |
PA
NA
AˆAˆH + PBNB BˆBˆ
H
1 + PAσ2EA + PBσ
2
EB
+ I|}
+

K2NE log
(
1 + PAσ
2
EA + PBσ
2
EB
1 + σ2mineE1
)
, K2 ≤ NA +NB
NE log
(
(1 + PAσ
2
EA + PBσ
2
EB)
K2(
1 + |T| 1NA+NB eE2
)NA+NB
)
, K2 > NA +NB
, R+E,t
(70)
One can also verify I(s¯A, s¯B ; yE |aˆ, bˆ) ≥
K2E{log |
PA
NA
AˆAˆH+
PB
NB
BˆBˆH
1+PAσ2EA+PBσ
2
EB
+ I|} , R−E,t which is the
first term in (70).
When PA = PB = P → ∞, we have σ2EA → bNAaNB+bNA ,
σ2EB → aNBaNB+bNA , σ2A → 0, σ2B → 0, E{aˆiaˆ∗i } →
aNB
aNB+bNA
, E{bˆibˆ∗i } → bNAaNB+bNA , E{hˆA,ihˆ∗A,i} → 1,
E{hˆB,ihˆ∗B,i} → 1, σ2min = P min{σ
2
EA
NA
,
σ2EB
NB
} and
|T| 1NA+NB = P ((σ2EANA )NA(
σ2EB
NB
)NB )1/(NA+NB).
Then, similar to (57), we have
lim
P→∞
R−A
logP
= lim
P→∞
R+A
logP
= K2 min{NA, NB} (71)
One can also verify that
lim
P→∞
R−E,t
logP
= 0 (72)
and
lim
P→∞
R+E,t
logP
=
{
0, K2 ≤ NA +NB
NE(K2 −NA −NB), K2 > NA +NB
(73)
Now applying (57), (71), (72) and (73), and using R+two ,
1
K2
[R+A +R+B −R−E,t]+ and R−two , 1K2 [R
−
A +R−B −R+E,t]+
as upper and lower bounds on Rtwo, we have
lim
P→∞
R−two
logP
=

2 min{NA, NB}, K2 ≤ NA +NB(
2 min{NA, NB} − NE
K2
(K2 −NA −NB)
)+
, K2 > NA +NB
(74)
and
lim
P→∞
R+two
logP
= 2 min{NA, NB} (75)
We see that if K2 ≤ NA + NB , limP→∞ RtwologP =
2 min{NA, NB} which equals the degrees of freedom of
the full-duplex channel between Alice and Bob. And if
K2 > NA + NB , the above lower bound on limP→∞ RtwologP
decreases linearly as NE increases. We see an advantage of
two-way information transmission over one-way information
transmission.
B. Eve uses blind detection with zero knowledge of its CSI
Now we reconsider the case of one-way information trans-
mission from Alice to Bob in the second phase but assume that
Eve performs a blind detection of the information transmitted
from Alice. For the blind detection shown next, we also
assume that K2 > NA and Eve’s knowledge of its CSI
matrix
√
aA ∈ CNE×K2 is zero. (The two-way information
transmission between Alice and Bob in either half-duplex or
ideal full-duplex can be treated similarly. For the case of
K2 ≤ NA, Eve cannot receive any information from the users
due to its unknown CSI.)
The signal received by Eve during information transmission
from Alice over K2 sampling intervals is
YE =
√
aASA + NE (76)
where the elements in SA ∈ CNA×K2 are assumed to be
independently chosen from a known constellation SN with size
N . Assume that Eve performs the blind detection as follows:(
Sˆ, Aˆ
)
= arg min
S∈SNA×K2N ,
√
aA∈CNE×K2
‖YE −
√
aAS‖2F . (77)
Given any S, the optimal
√
aA is YESH
(
SSH
)−1
. Then,
the above problem reduces to the following (an issue of
uniqueness will be addressed later)
Sˆ = arg min
S∈SNA×K2N
‖YE −YESH
(
SSH
)−1
S‖2F , (78)
or equivalently Sˆ = arg max
S∈SNA×K2N
f (s) , where f (s) =
Tr
(
SH
(
SSH
)−1
SZ
)
, s = vec (S) and Z = YHEYE . The
above problem is computationally expensive. But we assume
that Eve is able to afford it.
Assume that the solution Sˆ of the above problem is so
close to the actual information matrix S0 that f (s) can be
replaced by its 2nd-order Taylor’s series expansion (which is
conservative for Alice and Bob or equivalently optimistic for
Eve). Then sˆ = vec
(
Sˆ
)
has the following properties
∇sf˜ (s) |s=sˆ = 0, (79)
∇s∗ f˜ (s) |s=sˆ = 0, (80)
11
where f˜ (s) is the second-order Taylor series expansion [45]
of f (s) around s0 = vec (S0), i.e.,
f˜ (s) =
f (s0) +∇Ts f (s) |s=s0 (s− s0) +∇Ts∗f (s) |s=s0 (s− s0)∗
+
1
2
[
(s− s0)H Hss (s− s0) + (s− s0)H Hs∗s (s− s0)∗
+ (s− s0)T Hss∗ (s− s0) + (s− s0)T Hs∗s∗ (s− s0)∗
]
.
(81)
which involves the Hessian matrices: Hss = ∂∂s (∇s∗f) |s=s0 ,
Hs∗s =
∂
∂s∗ (∇s∗f) |s=s0 , Hss∗ = ∂∂s (∇sf) |s=s0 , Hs∗s∗ =
∂
∂s∗ (∇sf) |s=s0 . Subject to uniqueness of solution, solving
(79) and (80) results in the following [45]
sˆ−s0 =
(
Hss −Hs∗sH−Tss HHs∗s
)−1 (
Hs∗sH
−T
ss ∇sf −∇s∗f
)
.
(82)
Furthermore,
∇s∗f =
(
Z
(
I− SH (SSH)−1 S))T ⊗ (SSH)−1 s, (83)
∇sf = (∇sf)∗ , (84)
Hss =[
Z− ZSH (SSH)−1 S− SH (SSH)−1 SZ
+SH
(
SSH
)−1
SZSH
(
SSH
)−1
S
]T
⊗ (SSH)−1
+
(
SH
(
SSH
)−1
S− I
)T
⊗ SH (SSH)−1 SZSH (SSH)−1 S,
(85)
Hs∗s =[(((
SSH
)−1
SZ
)(
SH
(
SSH
)−1
S− I
))T
⊗ (SSH)−1 S+[(
SSH
)−1
S
]T
⊗
((
SSH
)−1
SZ
)(
SH
(
SSH
)−1
S− I
)]
Π
(86)
where Π is a permutation matrix with
Πi,j =
{
1 j =
(
(i− 1) mod NA
)
K2 + b(i− 1) /NAc
0 else
(87)
where a mod b denotes the remainder of the division of a by
b. For more details about complex derivatives, please refer to
[45].
Because of the blind nature, Hss is always rank deficient by
N2A. To remove the ambiguity, we can treat the first NA of the
transmitted vectors from Alice as known, which is equivalent
to removing N2A corresponding rows and N
2
A corresponding
columns from each of Hss and Hs∗s, and removing N2A
corresponding elements from each of ∇sf and ∇s∗f . This
results in H¯ss, H¯s∗s, ∇¯sf and ∇¯s∗f , respectively. Hence the
MSE matrix M¯ of the remaining unknown parameters can be
formed as
M¯ = E
[(
sˆ− s0
) (
sˆ− s0
)H]
, (88)
where sˆ− s0 is the approximation of errors in the vector of
all NA(K2 −NA) remaining symbols and
sˆ− s0 =
(
H¯ss − H¯s∗sH¯−Tss H¯Hs∗s
)−1 (
H¯s∗sH¯
−T
ss ∇¯sf − ∇¯s∗f
)
(89)
Finally, for K2 > NA, Eve’s effective rate (with the in-
formation in the first NA vectors of s(k) removed) can be
approximated as
R
(2)
AE =
1
K2
(
log |Q¯| − log |M¯|) , (90)
where Q¯ is the covariance matrix of the vector of all remaining
symbols.
To evaluate R(2)AE , one has to specify the actual constellation
SN of each symbol in S, compute sˆ− s0 for each actual
realization of S0 according to (89), and then obtain a sample
averaged version of M¯ in (88). Each of the realizations of
S0 should be coupled with an independent realization of the
channel matrix A and the noise matrix NE . With the final
sample-averaged versions of Q¯ and M¯, R(2)AE in (90) can be
obtained.
For the next two plots, we assume that SN is 4-QAM3, 100
random realizations of S0, A and NE are used in computing
R
(2)
AE . Also, during information transmission from Alice to
Bob, PA = 30dB (and PB = 0). In this case, due to high
power, we expect the Taylor’s series expansion applied in our
derivation is accurate.
Fig. 6 shows R(2)AE versus K2/NA where NA = NB = 4
and NE = 8. We see that only when K2 becomes much larger
than NA, R
(2)
AE approaches RAE . Note that R
(2)
AE is based on
unknown CSI at Eve and blind detection at Eve while RAE
is based on the assumption that Eve knows its CSI perfectly.
Fig. 7 shows the averaged secret rate R¯S = (E [RAB −
R
(2)
AE ])
+ versus NE where NA = NB = 4. (The curves in
this figure were zoomed in for the range of NE from 4 to 20.
The actually computed points were at NE = 4, 8, 16, 32.) In
this case, (E [RAB−RAE ])+ is zero for all values of NE . But
when Eve is blind to its CSI (caused by ANECE), the secrecy
rates become substantial. In this case, we also see that for
given K2 > NA the secrecy rate decreases as the number of
antennas on Eve increases.
3For higher order constellations, the simulation became too slow and
consuming.
Fig. 6. Eve’s rates vs K2/NA for known or unknown CSI at Eve. With
ANECE, Eve does not know its CSI. Otherwise, Eve does.
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Fig. 7. R¯S vs. NE for known or unknown CSI at Eve. With ANECE, Eve
does not know its CSI. Otherwise, Eve does.
The above results in this subsection complement the an-
alytical insights shown in the previous subsection (e.g., see
(60)). Due to different assumptions, we cannot make a precise
comparison between (60) and Figs. 6 and 7 while the general
trends predicted in both cases are somewhat consistent. An
additional discussion of the blind detection where Eve uses
a partial knowledge of its CSI from phase 1 is shown in
Appendix B.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the secrecy performance
of a full-duplex MIMOME network in some important scenar-
ios. In the first part of this paper, we studied how to optimize
the jamming powers from both Alice and Bob when Eve’s CSI
is unknown to Alice and Bob but Eve knows all CSI. To handle
Eve’s CSI being unknown to Alice and Bob, we focused
on Eve at the most harmful location and adopted the large
matrix theory that yields a hardened secret rate for any large
number of antennas on Eve. With the optimized powers, we
revealed a significant improvement in terms of the maximum
tolerable number of antennas on Eve. In the second part of this
paper, we analyzed the full-duplex MIMOME network subject
to the application of anti-eavesdropping channel estimation
(ANECE) in a two-phase scheme. Assuming that a statistical
model of CSI anywhere is known everywhere, we derived
lower and upper bounds on the secure degrees of freedom of
the network, which reveal clearly how the number of antennas
on Eve affect these bounds. In particular, for 1 ≤ K2 ≤ NA
in one-way information transmission or 1 ≤ K2 ≤ NA +NB
in two-way information transmission, the lower and upper
bounds coincide and equal to those of the channel capacity
between Alice and Bob. Furthermore, assuming that Eve does
not have any prior knowledge of its CSI but uses blind
detection in phase 2 of the two-phase scheme, we provided
and illustrated an approximate secrecy rate for K2 > NA
in one-way information transmission. But the exact secrecy
rate of the full-duplex MIMOME network with ANECE for
K2 larger than the total number of transmitting antennas still
remains elusive. Nevertheless, the contributions shown in this
paper are significant additions to our previous works shown in
[31] and [36], which expands the understanding of full-duplex
radio for wireless network security.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The following proof is a simple digest from [37] that is
useful to help readers to understand Lemma 1 more easily. The
Shannon transform of the distribution of a random variable X
with parameter γ is defined as
VX(γ) = EX [log(1 + γX)], (91)
and the η- transform of the distribution of X with parameter
γ is defined as
ηX(γ) = EX [ 1
1 + γX
], (92)
where γ ≥ 0. The empirical cumulative distribution function
of the eigenvalues of an n × n random non-negative-definite
Hermitian matrix A is defined as
FnA(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1{λi(A) ≤ x} (93)
where λ1(A), . . . , λn(A) are the eigenvalues of A, and 1{.}
is the indicator function. When FnA(x) converges as n→∞,
the corresponding limit is denoted by FA(x).
It is obvious that
1
n
log |I + γA| = 1
n
n∑
i=1
log(1 + γλi(A))
=
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + γx)dFnA(x), (94)
and if n→∞ then
1
n
log |I + γA| →
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + γx)dFA(x) (95)
which is the Shannon transform of the eigenvalue distribution
of the matrix A when n is large.
The Shannon transform of the eigenvalue distribution of
Θ with parameter η is obviously given by (19). And the η-
transform of the eigenvalue distribution of Θ with parameter
x is obviously given by
ηΘ(x) =
1
LΘ
LΘ∑
j=1
1
1 + xΘj,j
. (96)
From Theorem 2.39 in [37], the η-transform of the eigen-
value distribution of JΘJH with parameter γ, denoted by η
here, satisfies
β =
1− η
1− ηΘ(γη) . (97)
Applying (96) to the above equation with γ = 1 yields
1− η = β
1− 1
LΘ
LΘ∑
j=1
1
1 + ηΘj,j
 (98)
which reduces to (20). Also from Theorem 2.39 in [37], the
Shannon transform of the eigenvalue distribution of JΘJH
with parameter γ = 1 is
VJΘJH (1) = βVΘ(η)− log (η) + (η − 1) log (e) (99)
which is Ω(β,Θ, η) in (18).

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APPENDIX B
EVE USES BLIND DETECTION WITH PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE
OF ITS CSI
Now we consider the case where Eve can use its signal in
phase 1 to obtain its CSI up to a subspace ambiguity, i.e., in
the absence of noise, Eve can obtain from YE as in (44c) the
following:
Aˆ = A + ΘCA (100)
Bˆ = B + ΘCB (101)
where [CA,CB ] ∈ Cmin{NA,NB}×(NA+NB) is a known matrix
satisfying [CA,CB ][PTA,P
T
B ]
T = 0. For convenience and
without loss of generality, we assume here a = b = 1.
With one-way information transmission from Alice to Bob
in phase 2, Eve can now perform a constrained blind detection
as follows:
min
S∈SNA×K2N ,A|Aˆ=A+ΘCA
‖YE −AS‖2 (102)
or equivalently
min
S∈SNA×K2N ,Θ
‖YE − (Aˆ−ΘCA)S‖2. (103)
For any given S, the solution for Θ is
Θ = −(YE − AˆS)(CAS)H(CAS(CAS)H)−1. (104)
Then, the problem of (103) reduces to
min
S∈SNA×K2N
‖(YE − AˆS)(IK2 −PCAS)‖2 (105)
where PCAS = (CAS)
H(CAS(CAS)
H)−1CAS. The prob-
lem of (105) is more complex than (78) due to higher order
of the cost function in terms of S. A performance analysis of
(105) can be done in a similar way as for (78) but is omitted.
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